Studies on the role of national parliaments in the EU have conventionally looked at the formal capabilities and activities of legislatures as collective actors. We aim to strengthen the bridge to the growing literature on the politicisation of the EU by examining individual-level mobilisation within the parliament. In order to enrich our understanding of the actors and inner workings that drive or impede the parliamentarisation of EU politics, we shift the focus from preferences to opportunity and incentive structures and levels of party control faced by different categories of MPs. Our case study of plenary debates on the Greek crisis in the German Bundestag (2010Bundestag ( -2015 analyses three types of activity: legislative speech, voting defection and explanations of vote. Our results show that different thresholds of mobilisation translate into intra-party variance based on MPs' rank, experience, electoral mandate and gender. Here, the frontbencher-backbencher categorisation shows the most consistent effect.
2015a), which means that plenary debates may project disproportionate party cohesion as backbenchers and dissenting MPs are unlikely to receive speaking time. But any MP can deliver an EoV to provide justification for her voting decision and/or voice reservations. EoVs are therefore a very useful additional data source for the study of party cohesion.
Our comprehensive approach addresses some of the limitations faced by studies that focus solely on voting behaviour, primarily because we shift the focus from preferences to the incentive and opportunity structures of legislators and look at individual-level behaviour in the context of institutional constraints. Our analysis confirms the significance of party control in setting the room of manoeuvre for individual MPs. We test how an MP's electoral mandate, length of membership and rank affect her legislative behaviour. While we find some evidence that mandate, experience as well as gender matter, the distinction between frontbenchers and backbenchers shows the most consistent effect across all three types of activity. Another key finding is that EoVs, despite their limited visibility, provide a meaningful channel of expression for MPs with limited influence.
The first section defines politicisation in the parliamentary setting and conceptualises mobilisation as the third stage in the politicisation process. In the second section, we discuss the significance of party control in shaping individual-level behaviour and theorise its divergent effects on MPs depending on their mandate, experience, position or office, and gender. Here, we develop several expectations that structure our empirical analysis. Before presenting the results of our regression analysis, we introduce our case study, data set, methods and descriptive results. The final section summarises the contribution of this study and outlines directions for future research.
EU politicisation in national parliaments
In the course of European integration, as more and more competences have been shifted to the supranational level, national parliaments have gradually adapted to the political and legal realities of EU multilevel governance. Since the establishment of EACs, which accelerated in the 1990s, the scholarly interest in the Europeanisation processes of national parliaments and their role as a source of legitimation for the EU polity has steadily increased. Comparative scholars (Karlas 2012; Raunio 2005; Winzen 2012; have classified and ranked national parliaments by measuring their legislative scrutiny capability and impact on the governments' negotiating position. Auel et al. (2015) recognise that previous comparative endeavours focused solely on the formal capabilities and legislative function of parliaments, and attempt to establish the link between institutional capacity and actual levels of parliamentary activity. While institutional strength 1 shows a strong correlation with the number of mandates and resolutions issued, the correlation with debating activity is very weak. This is an intriguing finding, especially when considering the recent shift in the literature from the legislative and oversight activities to the communicative role, that is, from the government-related function to the citizen-related function of member state legislatures (Miklin 2014; Rauh 2015; Wendler 2016) . There is an increasing recognition of the importance of public parliament debates on EU issues, but we still lack a thorough understanding of the conditions, mechanisms and actors that drive these debates. The growing literature on politicisation can provide some insights into these questions.
Our understanding of politicisation draws on Mouffe's (2005: 8-34; ) definition of 'the political' as the site of conflict and antagonism, rather than liberty and common action. According to Mouffe (2005: 10) , 'political questions are not mere technical issues to be solved by experts' but 'always involve decisions which require us to make a choice between conflicting alternatives'.
Following this line of thought, politicisation is the making visible of conflicting alternatives. In the context of EU politics, the term politicisation has been used frequently, almost excessively, in recent years. Often, it is merely an umbrella term (deliberately placed in quotation marks) to describe a general intensification in the level of contention and the way the EU and its policies are publicly perceived and debated at the domestic level. There have been only few attempts to thoroughly conceptualise and operationalise politicisation as a process -or rather processes -of contestation. Neofunctionalists anticipated a politicisation of European integration for a long time:
Politicization … refers initially to a process whereby the controversiality of joint decisionmaking goes up. This in turn is likely to lead to a widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration. … The minimal threshold for politicization is a rise in the controversiality of the regional decisionmaking process. (Schmitter 1969: 166, italics in original) Similarly to Schmitter, de Wilde (2011: 566-7) emphasises contentiousness when defining politicisation as 'an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards policy formulation within the EU'. This definition also implies the centrality of communication.
When it comes to operationalising politicisation, de Wilde and Zürn (2012) use three indicators: growing awareness, mobilisation and polarisation. This broad operationalisation can be adapted to the parliamentary setting. In fact, we argue elsewhere (Bhattacharya 2017 ) that these indicators can be regarded as three subsequent stages: (1) growing awareness among MPs, (2) an increase in controversiality 2 and (3) mobilisation. If MPs acknowledge that EU politics and domestic politics are mutually intertwined and are aware of their own role in the multi-level decision-making process, they possess the capacity to recognise the domestic implications and contentious nature of a given issue and their individual means of influence. Controversiality needs to not only be detected but also made visible, that is, communicated, to the public through mobilisation.
For de Wilde and Zürn (2012) , who employ a much broader approach by referring to the activities of political parties, social movements, trade unions and civil society organisations, mobilisation is 'an increase over time in the amount of resources spent in conflict on EU issues and the number of political actors engaged' (140, emphasis added). In the parliamentary setting, mobilisation -or the lack thereof -has been studied empirically by measuring the time invested for debating EU issues in the plenary (Auel and Raunio 2014; Raunio 2015) , while other scholars (García Lupato 2014; Rauh 2015) 
Legislative behaviour at the individual level
Conventionally, the literature on the role of national parliaments has looked at legislatures as collective entities. In order to get an insight into the internal workings that determine the content of parliamentary debates on the EU, we need to gain a comprehensive understanding of the type of legislators who are willing and in a position to invest resources, particularly time, and voice their opinion in EU debates. However, when shifting the focus to MPs as individual actors, we have to address the role of parliamentary parties in shaping individual-level behaviour.
The significance of party control
As is the case with parliaments, legislative parties are not unitary actors. They are internally divided, deeply hierarchical organisations, in which the leadership feels the responsibility to maintain unity and possesses a significant amount of resources and disciplinary instruments to do so. Generally, party leaders control the assignment of committee seats, access to the plenary floor and, to some extent, the media access as well. Furthermore, they are in a position to distribute rewards such as attractive trips abroad, office space or tickets to popular events. (Bailer 2017) Hence, when we look at the behaviour of legislators in order to draw inferences about their preferences, we need to be aware that their room of manoeuvre is constrained by their membership in a parliamentary party. As Saalfeld and Strøm (2014: 372) aptly point out, 'the world of legislative parties is one of considerable complexity, in which critical decisions are often unobservable or deliberately concealed'. Conceptually, we can make a distinction between party cohesion and party discipline, that is, between substantive agreement based on shared preferences, on the one hand, and cooperation under compulsion and anticipated sanctions, on the other hand (Hazan 2014) . Empirically, however, we face a serious 'observability problem': 'Absent direct measures of legislators' policy preferences, one cannot identify whether a party is united because its members have similar preferences … or because party leaders successfully impose discipline on outlying members' (Kam 2014: 402) . A third factor that might affect observed levels of party unity is agenda control, that is, the ability to avert votes on disputed issues (Carey 2007) , but in the German Bundestag, agenda-setting powers do not vary significantly between government and opposition parties (Becher and Sieberer 2008: 295-6 ). This 'black box' makes it challenging to assess the impact of party control on legislative behaviour.
Our empirical analysis focuses on RCVs, legislative speech and EoVs. For each form of activity, the level of party control and public visibility differs, which means that the threshold of mobilisation varies as well. Proksch and Slapin (2015b: 25-7) argue that how legislators choose to voice their disagreement with the party leadership depends on the level of discontent. Defecting from party line on a recorded vote, 'especially on one that is both high profile and whipped, constitutes the ultimate act of defiance ' (ibid.: 26) . The act of defection may help MPs to raise their profile independent of the party label, but rebels risk to be punished by the party whips.
MPs who dissent less strongly or fear the potential sanctions for a defective vote may, at least in theory, choose to raise their concerns in a plenary speech instead. In the case of the German Contrary to addressing the plenary assembly, every legislator in the German Bundestag has an equal opportunity to state the reasons for her voting decision in an EoV (Becher and Sieberer 2008: 296) . EoVs are written statements signed by one or more MPs that are annexed to the official minutes and often published on MPs' personal websites. Since there are no party political constraints for the usage of this instrument, it provides a channel to explain defection or voice reservations despite voting along party line (Sieberer 2015) . Although its public visibility is relatively low, the usage of EoVs is a good measure of mobilisation across and within parliamentary party groups.
Theorising intra-party variance in mobilisation
The variety of control mechanisms and disciplinary measures do not affect legislators equally. The threshold of mobilisation is contingent upon the mandate, experience and rank of the individual MP. Previous studies suggest that personal characteristics such as gender could also be a relevant factor. We would thus expect to find intra-party variance in legislative behaviour for different categories of MPs.
The German Bundestag employs a mixed-member proportional system, which makes it an interesting case to investigate whether behavioural differences exist between MPs elected from single-member districts and MPs elected via closed party lists. The existing literature on legislative behaviour in the Bundestag provides mixed results regarding this question (see e.g. Becher and Sieberer 2008; Degner and Leuffen 2016; Manow 2013; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2010; Zittel 2014) .
Those studies which do find behavioural differences tend to emphasise the explanatory power of the competition and strategy for re-election rather than the type of electoral mandate received in the previous election: Ohmura (2014) shows that MPs with a pure district candidacy strategy are significantly more likely to defect than MPs with a pure list or dual candidacy strategy, but, interestingly, this is not because of local concerns. Similarly, Sieberer (2010: 494) argues -on the basis of analysing the content of EoVs by party rebels -that 'district MPs use their higher electoral independence to deviate from the party line for other reasons' than 'cross-pressure … due to demands by the party and the local electorate as competing principals'. What could be the other reasons then? If district MPs seek the personal vote (Gschwend and Zittel 2015) , they are prone to engage in constituency service and 'feel the need to differentiate themselves from their parliamentary party by taking positions countering party stands or even by voting against their party on issues that are salient to constituents (especially when government survival is not at stake)' (André et al. 2014: 87-8, emphasis added) . The main point is that those issues that constituents attach most importance to are not necessarily local issues. In Germany, the euro crisis has certainly become a prominent issue, and public opinion towards financial aid for Greece has been hostile from the start. Given that political parties are generally more pro-European than their voters (Mattila and Raunio 2012) , the question arises whether district MPs are more responsive to the electorate in EU affairs 3 . For the RCVs on the euro crisis in the Bundestag, we would expect defection to be driven by district MPs. It will be interesting to see to what extent list MPs make use of other forms of activity.
The literature on parliamentary socialisation looks at how newly elected MPs find their own role, balance their new responsibilities and learn to manoeuvre in an institutional setting that is shaped by antagonistic cooperation, which means that newcomers need to learn how to cooperate with competitors inside and outside their own parliamentary party. Best and Vogel (2014: 60) conclude that 'the ambition of newcomers to gain political influence and their lack of resources necessary to achieve this goal are the central incentives for these junior legislators to adapt to the internal rules and norms'. This being said, our expectation is that lack of experience, measured in years of membership in parliament, is correlated with conformist behaviour. Can we therefore assume that experienced MPs are more likely to express dissent? It depends on their rank within the party. According to Kam (2014: 404) While the existing literature does not indicate a significant gender effect with regards to party unity, a study by Bäck et al. (2014) suggests that gender could play a role in the allocation of floor time. Their analysis of plenary debates in the Swedish Riksdag, which has one of the highest shares of female MPs worldwide, shows that women give fewer speeches overall and their underrepresentation is particularly pronounced in debates on 'harder' policy issues such as macroeconomics, transportation, finance and energy. Although the reasons for female underrepresentation in specific policy areas are still subject to debate 4 , we expect some gender-based division of labour, regardless of rank and experience, in debates on the euro crisis, which despite its complexity can be considered a predominantly macroeconomic and fiscal issue.
Individual-level mobilisation in German Bundestag debates on the Greek crisis
The German Bundestag is a comparatively strong chamber in terms of its institutional powers (Auel et al. 2015) , but nonetheless, it is an unlikely case for politicisation. The Bundestag is typically described as a 'working parliament', meaning that there is a strong focus on legislative scrutiny in the standing committees rather than heated debates in the plenary. Despite strong opposition rights and a moderately strong EU scrutiny system, contestation of EU affairs is generally limited due to a solid pro-European consensus among the major parties (Auel and Raunio 2014 Hence, 'Germany provides perhaps the best paradigmatic example of a system of limited contestation' (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 351) . Case studies (see e.g. Auel and Raunio 2014; Miklin 2014 ) support the notion that before the euro crisis there have been only very few instances (most notably the Services Directive) when the disputed nature of EU policies has been recognised and publicly discussed in the Bundestag.
The events around the euro crisis presented German MPs with an unprecedented stimulus to demand a close involvement in the EU-level crisis management, not least because -as the Federal Constitutional Court pointed out on numerous occasions -the parliament's budget authority was at stake and public opinion was highly sceptical about making loan commitments to other member states, particularly Greece. Between 2010 and 2015, the Bundestag passed twelve acts that were considered decisive for managing and resolving the crisis (see Table 1 ), and five of those decisions centred around aid packages for Greece. Over the course of the crisis, voting unity dropped well below average in all party groups with the exception of the Social Democrats (SPD), which became more united after joining the government in October 2013 (see Figure 1 for our visualisation of voting unity using the Agreement Index by Hix et al. 2003 5 ). The Greek crisis has been debated for more than ten hours in the plenary assembly, amounting to 74 speeches and 15 interventions/questions. In total, MPs issued 418 EoVs regarding the euro crisis, out of which 248 EoVs (including eight oral statements) were in relation to RCVs on the Greek situation. This study analyses the voting results, paying particular attention to party rebels, and asks who gets to speak in the plenary assembly and who makes use of EoVs and why. The primary objective is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the patterns of parliamentary mobilisation, and the actors and mechanisms that drive or try to control it.
Data, variables and methods
We collected data of all MPs and their activities from May 2010 until August 2015. The period of observation stretches across two legislative periods and, in total, our data set comprises of 881 MPs.
394 of them have actively participated in the debates on the Greek crisis, which means they have at least once cast a defecting vote, delivered a plenary speech or issued an EoV. For those active MPs, we also collected data on the various positions and offices they hold in government, the parliamentary party group or central party organisation.
All votes related to euro crisis measures were recorded, which in itself tells us something about their public visibility and the level of importance attached to them. Historically, only around 5 per cent of votes in the Bundestag are recorded (Bergmann et al. 2016: 26) . A RCV needs to be requested by one party group or a minimum of 5 per cent of total MPs. Party groups, especially on the opposition side, call for RCVs to increase public attention for their own position or to reveal internal divisions within their political opponents. Furthermore, RCVs can be used as a strategic measure to close ranks and deter potential dissenters. (ibid.: 31) When measuring defection as a form of individual-level mobilisation, we also take into account abstentions, because in our case an abstention can be clearly distinguished from being absent. In fact, entire party groups occasionally choose to abstain. Hence, any vote that does not follow the party line is counted as deviant 6 .
First, we sort our data in a long format so that every observation corresponds to a different parliamentary action relevant to the Greek crisis, of which there were five (see Table 1 Under Model 2, we add another variable in order to test whether longer-serving MPs are more rebellious than newly elected ones if they sit on the backbenches because they never had a highranking position or have been demoted from the frontbench (Kam 2009; . Therefore, we use a dummy variable ('Exp-backbencher'), where backbenchers are MPs with no position of responsibility and experience means membership in the Bundestag for at least two terms (i.e. more than eight years).
Descriptive analyses
In the 17 th legislative term, the Bundestag approved the first and second package (in May 2010 and February 2012 respectively). In the 18 th term, the Bundestag voted on the extension of the second package (in February 2015), the government's mandate for negotiating the third package (in July 2015) and the adoption of the third package (in August 2015). In the previous term, 26.7 per cent of MPs became involved, meaning they gave a speech, defected and/or delivered an EoV in at least one of the two debates. For the three debates in 2015, the overall mobilisation rate has increased to
per cent. A partial explanation for the higher mobilisation in 2015 is the fact that Bundestag
MPs had to return twice from summer recession only to debate and vote on the Greek crisis. If we exclude the usage of joint EoVs, for which the resources to be spent are rather low if a large number of fellow MPs co-sign, we still observe that the mobilisation rate doubled from 15.9 per cent to 30.2 per cent. This increase is mainly driven by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union (CSU) and to a lesser extent the Greens, whereas mobilisation in the SPD has dropped since they joined the coalition government (see Appendix 3). Table 2 shows that the level of mobilisation also differs by the type of activity. Merely 4 per cent of MPs had the opportunity to address the plenary assembly. Even though in the 18 th term the amount of plenary speeches has almost doubled (from 27 to 47 speeches), the total number of speakers remained stable, which is a first indication of party control. Defection saw a significant increase, when in 2015 one in six MPs voted against their own party. We need to keep in mind that the government majority is much larger in the 18 th term, which means that government parties could 'afford' more deviant votes. In empirical reality, however, Bergmann et al.'s (2016: 47) longitudinal study does not provide convincing evidence of a majority size effect on voting unity after 1990. Individual and joint EoVs were issued by more MPs as well, indicating that German legislators felt a stronger need to communicate their views using the means available to them. We know from a recent study by Sieberer (2015: 289-90 According to Sieberer (2015) , around one quarter of EoVs fully support the party line, another quarter explain defection and the other half are of the yes-but type, meaning that MPs voice their discontent despite voting along party line. Our analysis of 240 written EoVs that 445 MPs delivered for the five voting sessions on the Greek crisis reveals a fairly equal distribution across the three categories (see Table 3 ). Yet overall, MPs most commonly use EoVs to express some doubts or 
Regression analyses
In Table 4 , we present the results of logit models in terms of odds ratio (OR), and robust standard errors are given in parentheses. A first observation is that the condition number is small in both Model 1 and Model 2 for all models. Although 'large condition numbers do not necessarily imply poor identification' (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004: 20) , small numbers indicate that the Hessian matrix is not singular and the models are well identified. A second observation is that the variance of the intercept for different subjects (i.e. MPs) is virtually zero when EoV is the dependent variable.
Therefore, in this case one would get the exact same estimates having had pooled the data together and run a simple logit model instead of specifying a multilevel analysis.
Regarding our 'core' independent variables, we see that only rank has a statistical significant effect in all three types of individual-level activity (with the exception of defection in Model 2). The odds to deliver a speech are 11 times larger (47 under Model 2) for frontbench MPs compared to lower-rank MPs. The opposite is true in reference to the other two regression models: the odds of delivering an EoV or casting a deviant vote are smaller for high-ranking MPs compared to backbenchers. These results make for intuitive logic, as MPs in a high-rank position are less likely to express grievances against the official party line.
Interestingly, the regression analysis shows that mandate has a significant effect only in reference to EoV. The odds of delivering an EoV appear to be smaller for an MP who has been elected from a single-member district compared to an MP who has been elected off the party list.
This might seem surprising, as one would expect that district MPs are more likely to mobilise, but this result confirms that EoVs offer a channel of communication for MPs who find the threshold of defection too high or have more to lose. Different years of experience appear to have a statistical significant effect somewhat in the case of deviant voting. The odds that the most experienced MPs (25 years and more) will vote against the party line are four times greater in comparison to MPs with little parliamentary experience (less than nine years). In order to test Kam's (2009; argument that experienced MPs who sit on the backbenches, because they have either been demoted or never secured a frontbench position in the first place, are the most rebellious, we combine experience with rank in Model 2. We find that MPs with at least eight years of experience who hold a backbench position are more likely than less experienced MPs to defect and to deliver a speech. However the latter result does not necessarily imply support of Kam's argument, since a speech is not a 'rebellious act' in the same sense as casting a deviant ballot is.
Looking at gender effects, we find that female MPs are less likely to appear on the plenary floor but more likely to give an EoV compared to their male colleagues. As expected, the odds of A first observation is that rank maintains the same effect and its statistical significance in all three types of activities. Table 5 shows that the lagged value of the dependent variable significantly affects the dependent one the cases of defection and EoV. More precisely, defecting in a previous parliamentary action increases the odds of casting a deviant vote in the future by eleven times. This effect also holds when lagging voting by two time units (Model B). The odds ratio of the lagged dependent variable decreases by three units. The effect remains strong, which can be explained by the fact that dissenters, especially from the governing parties, have little incentive to change their voting behaviour once they have crossed the threshold of defection, given that the issue at hand has become more contested while the government's official position remained largely unaltered.
Secondly, we see that most other estimates are not reduced dramatically and also maintain their statistical significance (compare the results of Model B with those of Model 1 in Table 4 ). What is even more intriguing, our results (see Model C) show that an MP who explained her voting decision in the past is two times more likely to defect in a future vote compared to MPs who did not deliver an EoV. In other words, EoVs are a first step towards deviant voting and can function as a 'warning' mechanism for party leaderships.
To sum up, our results reveal a significant effect of a legislator's rank within his party. Also the years of experience as an MP and even gender are relevant in explaining mobilisation patterns in the German Bundestag. We find only limited evidence of a 'mandate divide', and yet it seems that dissenters were rewarded electorally. In the 17 th term, there were 37 dissenters in total, of which 19 were district MPs and 18 list MPs. 16 of the rebellious district MPs were re-elected in the 2013 election and three retired. All but one district MP achieved a better result than in previous election, and 13 of them outperformed their party (in terms of net gain compared to their party's performance in the respective federal state). While defection may be rewarded electorally, especially when public opinion is more sceptical than the political elite, we do not find any supporting evidence that rebellious list MPs have been dropped down on the closed party list. (Then again, we have to bear in mind that only one list MP from the CDU, i.e. the only government party that has a significant share of district mandates, defected in the 17 th term.)
Conclusion
When talking about the politicisation, meaning increasing contestation and domestication, of EU politics, we cannot simply assume that national legislatures would be a driving force in these 23 processes. Mobilisation in the parliamentary setting is both enabled and constrained by institutional conditions, which are to a large extent shaped by political parties. This study is premised on the argument that the German Bundestag is anything but an obvious case of EU contestation.
Conventionally, the pro-EU cross-partisan consensus is named as the key factor. Since the onset of the euro crisis at the latest, cracks emerged in this consensus, and in line with earlier theoretical propositions dissent started to form within mainstream parties as least as much as between parties.
As it is in the interest of the party leadership to maintain a cohesive party label and party discipline is generally strong in the Bundestag, we discuss the theoretical implications of party control and test how it affects individual-level mobilisation around the Greek crisis, a complex and contentious policy issue that has received more and more public attention over the years.
Overall, mobilisation rates have increased over the course of the crisis, but we find considerable intra-party variation in legislative speech, voting defection and the usage of EoVs.
Party leaders exercise tight control of the Bundestag's plenary floor, resulting in plenary debates dominated by party leaders themselves and other experienced frontbenchers, who toe the party line.
Party leaders also possess means to discipline legislators who defect from the party line in a recorded vote. We do not find clear evidence of a 'mandate divide' between district and list MPs, but our analysis confirms that backbenchers are much more likely to cast a deviant vote. The same is true for EoVs. Despite their limited visibility, EoVs provide an 'outlet', that is, a worthwhile exercise to raise their voice, for many legislators when controversiality is rising but this is not sufficiently reflected in the plenary debates due to party control. The fact that EoVs are even used quite extensively to express support for the party position is a meaningful indicator of widespread parliamentary mobilisation. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, our analysis establishes for the first time a link between EoVs and deviant voting, as we show that MPs who justify their voting decision are more likely to vote against their party in a future vote.
As summarised in Figure 3 , the mobilisation patterns we identify highlight that when public visibility and accordingly the level of party control decreases, participation in general tends to increase, as MPs sitting on the backbenches, MPs with little experience, MPs elected via party lists and -in 'hard' policy issues like this one -also female MPs are likely to get more involved. Figure 3 . Levels of public visibility, party control and mobilisation by type of activity.
At the beginning of this article we ask whether backbenchers, who tend to be more critical of, for instance, extending the EU's competences any further, have learned to fight back and make their voices heard within parliament, as claimed by Raunio and Hix (2000) . Out of all variables, our results show the most consistent effect regarding MPs' rank. We can therefore conclude that when the controversiality and public attention towards an EU issue are rising, backbenchers in the German Bundestag will express their opinion making use of the channels available to them or even defect. Since the most prominent channel, namely legislative speech, is closed to them, it remains questionable though to what extent they can actually influence the public debate.
When examining the contestation of EU politics in national chambers of parliament, the consideration of institutional conditions is of utmost importance. This study discusses and empirically verifies how levels of party control affect what types of MPs participate in the debates.
For future research, the next obvious step would be to analyse the impact on the actual content of the debate. We need to ask how the absence of certain actors shapes the parliamentary debate that is visible to the wider public. In other words, why does it matter who speaks for the party?
1. The OPAL score of institutional strength aggregates 11 indicators to measure access to information, the scrutiny infrastructure to process information and formal oversight and influence instruments.
2. We suggest that the notion of controversiality is to be preferred to polarisation, since polarisation may in fact mean a narrowing of the political space by reducing the political discussion to two opposing or extreme positions. 4. According to Bäck et al. (2014: 507-8) , there are three explanatory factors: (1) choices made on the basis of personal interests, (2) norms and gender stereotyping in society at large and in party organisations, and (3) hierarchies and strategic considerations within the parties.
5. The Agreement Index (Hix et al. 2003: 317) is calculated for each RCV as follows:
where Y i denotes the amount of 'yes' votes, N i the number of 'no' votes and A i the abstentions given by a party group i.
6. In July 2015, when the Bundestag voted on the government's mandate for negotiating the third aid package, the Greens did not have a whipped party line and this was reflected in very low voting unity (as illustrated in Figure 1 ). In this case, we could not count any votes as deviant in order to avoid skewed results.
Appendix 1. GLLAMM with adaptive quadrature.
As the GLLAMM is calculated using adaptive quadrature, its accuracy also depends on the number of integration points. Initially we run the model with quadrature points set at default (Q-default=8).
We store the vector of parameter estimates and then pass them as starting values to the new model increasing the number of integration points to Q=12. We find that differences between the estimates of the two specifications are larger than 0.01%, which is usually the acceptable threshold.
Increasing each time the number of integration points we notice that estimates are not affected by the choice of quadrature when Q=37. Although this number is four times larger than Q-default still all models converge very fast (it only takes four iterations for convergence). Following we keep the same number of integration points employing this time a model specification (xtlogit, re) that uses Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Liu and Pierce 1994; Lessafre and Spiessens 2001) . Using the same rule of thumb, that is 'if coefficients do not change by more than a relative difference of 10 -4 (0.01%), the choice of quadrature points does not significantly affect the outcome'
(http://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtquadchk.pdf, accessed 29 March 2017), we find that our model converges extremely well for the same number of quadrature points, that is Q=37. The reason that there is no difference found in the number of quadrature points between Gauss-Hermite quadrature and adaptive quadrature is probably due to the small cluster size. Results from the quadrature check between Q=37 and Q 1 =2×Q/3 and Q 2 =4×Q/3 are given in 
